![]() And with both strategies, the team enjoyed similar 10- to 15-percent improvements in their pressure rates and 25- to 30-percent improvements in their defensive DVOA after their Week 10 bye. But from the first half of last season to the second, the Ravens didn't change their frequency of four-man rushes or blitzes. The Ravens' pivot from Joe Flacco to Lamar Jackson at quarterback set off radical changes to the team's strategy and effectiveness that reverberated to the defensive side with differences in typical play totals and game scripts. They finished top-10 in both pressure rate and DVOA when they didn't blitz. One would assume that strategic change would follow an inability to generate pressure with a four-man rush, but that wasn't the case for the Ravens. I mentioned in my previous article that the Ravens really ramped up their blitzing in 2019, increasing from 26.4 percent to a league-leading 39.0 percent. In 2018, the Eagles were the only team with three players - Cox, Graham, and Long - with 30 or more hurries. They have done a tremendous job of building and replenishing quality defensive line depth by signing players such as Chris Long, trading for players such as Michael Bennett, and drafting players such as Derek Barnett to complement their core duo of Fletcher Cox and Brandon Graham. In that time, they have consistently generated pressure without a blitz on about one-third of their opponents' pass plays. The Eagles were the most frequent user of a four-man rush in 2018 and have been among the leaders each of the last three years. ![]() They finished just a few percentage points away from the 67.7 percent league-average rate of four-man rushes. And since they were good at both strategies, they didn't have to rely on either to an unusual degree. ![]() With excellent and flexible players at all three levels, they led all teams in DVOA when they sent the usual four rushers and when they blitzed. The Bears easily outpaced the other 31 teams in overall defensive DVOA last season and were the eighth-best defense in DVOA history. Four-Man Rushes Defenses with Four Pass-Rushers, 2018 To make sense of those vagaries, we can compare teams' reliance on and effectiveness with different numbers of pass-rushers. Blitzing teams improve their odds of a big play but also improve the odds that a big play will be made against them, and so a blitz can be either a good or bad strategy depending on factors like the game situation and offensive and defensive personnel. Four- and especially two- and three-man fronts that disrupt a quarterback enjoy the best of both worlds, forcing mistakes and leaving plenty of players in coverage to take advantage of them. Quarterback pressure splits show how important it is for defenses to generate pressure, but that calculus can change depending on the resources it takes for teams to do so. ![]()
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